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Abstract— Light rail systems have proliferated in Spain in the last 
decade, following a tendency that is common not only in other 
European countries but also in other parts of the world. This paper 
reviews the benefits of light rail systems, both related to 
environmental issues and mobility issues. It analyses the evolution of 
light rail projects in Spain and shows that light rail systems in this 
country have evolved towards an extensive use of public-private 
partnerships. The analysis of the Spanish projects, however, does not 
contribute any conclusive evidence about whether public-private 
partnerships have been more efficient than publicly owned 
enterprises in building and operating light rail systems. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
N the late 1980s there was a resurgence of tramways under 
the new denomination of ‘light rail’. The mode’s 
reemergence as an alternative means of transport to cars or 
buses was due to its potential to mitigate congestion and 
support mobility around urban centers [1]. Light rail transit 
(LRT) has developed as form of rail-based transport 
particularly suited for distances between 10 and 40 km. 
Common light rail train systems use two-car rolling-stock 
configurations with articulated joins between cars. This 
arrangement provides for greater passenger capacity while still 
allowing for tight radius-cornering capabilities [2,3]. 
In some cases, the differences between LRT systems and 
other urban rail systems are not clear in practice. To provide a 
clear picture of this, Table 1 shows the main technical features 
of light rail, subway and commuter trains, highlighting the 
operational similarities and differences. 
Light rail systems have proliferated in both developed and 
developing countries in the last decades [4,5]. Among 
European countries, LRT construction has been particularly 
evident in the United Kingdom, France, Spain, Portugal and 
Italy. 
This paper reviews the environmental and mobility benefits 
of LRT systems and analyses the evolution of LRT projects in 
Spain. Based on a survey of Spanish projects, the authors 
identify an evolution towards greater use of public-private 
partnerships in LRT construction and operation. The Spanish 
experience, however, does not contribute any conclusive 
evidence concerning the efficiency of the public-private 
partnerships relative to publicly owned enterprises. 
The paper draws on a review of the relevant literature, to 
which the authors add an analysis of data gathered from 
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Spanish light rail companies. Further context was provided 
through interviews with representatives of the majority of light 
rail projects in Spain. 
TABLE I 
TECHNICAL FEATURES OF URBAN RAIL SYSTEMS 
 Light rail Subway 
Commuter 
train 
Length of vehicle (m) 14-20 15-20 15-30 
N. of vehicles per unit 1-2 2-10 2-10 
Comm. speed (km/h) 18-23  25-40 25-50 
Distance bet. stops 450-800 1,000-2,000 2,000-4,000 
Passengers per vehicle 125 180 375 
Capac. seated (pass/h)  6,000-20,000  10,000-40,000 n.a. 
Source: Elaborated by the authors 
II. BENEFITS OF LIGHT RAIL SYSTEMS 
Concern over the environmental effects of urban transport 
occupies a prominent place in the global environmental 
agenda. Ever greater emphasis is placed on the effort to 
achieve efficient transport networks that offer sustainable 
mobility and are compatible with broader social and 
community aims. The main benefits of light rail systems may 
be divided into two categories: those related to environmental 
issues and those derived from its relationship to the urban 
environment. 
LRT systems offer significant environmental benefits. The 
past decades have produced continuous growth in the number 
of vehicles circulating on the highways and roads of developed 
countries. This has in turn instigated numerous studies on the 
environmental consequences of transport, with particular focus 
on the increasing carbon emissions and other gases and 
pollutants, and their noxious effect on human health. Until 
recently, the principal policy instrument for regulating the 
environmental impacts of transport has been the imposition of 
vehicle emissions standards achieved through technological 
improvement. Nonetheless, it has become clear that this is no 
longer sufficient if the environmental goals of the international 
community, such as the targets set by the Kyoto Protocol, are 
to be achieved. 
LRT systems have several important positive features from 
the environmental point of view: 
1) A more efficient use of natural resources. Unlike other 
modes of transport such as the automobile or the bus, LRT 
is driven by electric power. Therefore consumption of 
limited resources and emissions of pollutants can be 
reduced by use of renewable sources for electricity 
generation. 
2) The absence of polluting emissions since light rail 
vehicles do not employ fossil-fuelled combustion engines. 
In addition to this, LRT may lead to overall reduction in 
the overall emission of greenhouse gases by diverting 
traffic from other modes of transit (one light rail train is 
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equivalent to three or four buses). 
3) Energy savings deriving from the generation of electric 
power by the braking system that can be reused within the 
system.  
4) The reduction of noise pollution. LRT systems operating 
at maximum speed generate noise at around 60 decibels, 
far below the daytime noise levels in congested high-
density urban areas. Furthermore, the design and materials 
used in the rails, along with the anti-vibration systems 
fitted in the rail cars, contribute significantly to the 
reduction in noise generated by system operations 
 
Beyond strictly environmental benefits, LRT systems further 
contribute to a higher quality of urban life. The following 
features of LRT systems are relevant in this respect: 
1) Light rail vehicles are often pleasant, comfortable and 
versatile, and employ the latest technology, with low 
floors that considerably facilitate accessibility for all 
passengers. 
2) Light rail as a mode extends the right to transport to all 
citizens and allows an equitable division of public space, 
which has often been strongly dominated by the 
automobile. 
3) Transit along dedicated tracks allows light rail to circulate 
at commercially attractive speeds, meeting scheduled 
timetables and thus providing a reliable service to riders. 
4) Road occupancy is reduced, allowing more driving and 
parking space for remaining vehicles. As a result, there is 
a potential for the urban space to become more 
comfortable and more accessible for pedestrian mobility. 
5) Light rail contributes to consolidation of the urban pattern, 
limiting the distance of transit trips and favouring the 
creation of a compact, mixed-use city, with integration of 
residential, professional, academic, commercial and 
leisure areas. 
III. UTILIZATION OF PPP IN LIGHT RAIL SYSTEMS IN SPAIN 
In the last decade, LRT systems have proliferated in Spain. 
From 1994 to 2011, sixteen light rail projects have been built 
or commissioned in this country—almost all of them between 
2002 and 2011. Out of them, eleven are already in operation as 
shown in Table 3. The other five projects are under 
construction. The first project was delivered into service in 
Valencia in 1994. 
Out of the sixteen (16) light rails commissioned from 1994 
to 2011, only four (4) have been procured through traditional 
procurement routes, while the rest have been procured through 
different formulas of collaboration between the private and 
public sectors. The most common formula has been the 
Concession, which is granted in most cases for Build-Operate-
Transfer (BOT) schemes, but can also be granted for the 
operation of an existing infrastructure. In one of the cases 
(Tenerife) the project has been implemented through a mixed 
Special Purpose Company with private and public 
shareholders. 
As shown in Table 3, the analysis of the LRT projects 
implemented in Spain shows an evolution over the years 
towards the utilization of public-private partnerships and more 
specifically BOT formulas. The three first projects (Valencia, 
Bilbao and Alicante) were built and are managed by public 
companies. However, starting in 2004 most of the projects 
have been built and managed by private companies under a 
BOT scheme. In BOT projects the public authority contracts 
with an outside organization (developer) to provide services at 
a specified quality of service standards. The developer must, 
consequently, provide the required inventory of fixed and 
movable assets backed by its own resources or through 
external financing. The developer also retains all revenues and 
commits to absorb either all or a contractually agreed portion 
of traffic and revenue risks, as well as the risks associated with 
construction. Risk sharing may also extend into the areas of 
regulatory risk. A BOT is often the most appropriate type of 
contract for situations with no previous services and with a 
requirement to provide depots or other infrastructure. New 
light rail schemes are often covered by long-term contracts of 
this nature. To ensure sufficient time for recouping investment 
costs, these arrangements are generally long-term, with 
contract periods of 20 to 30 years [5]. 
The LRT projects built in Spain under a BOT scheme have 
followed the traditional risk allocation where the private sector 
bears construction risk and demand risk. However, almost all 
projects have some kind of mitigation mechanism for demand 
risk, usually through a minimum income guarantee. With this 
kind of guarantee, the concessionaire’s revenues are capped 
between +/- 30% of anticipated demand. 
The awarding criteria for the LRT projects built in Spain 
under a BOT scheme have followed similar patterns, as shown 
in Table 2. There are some differences in the various projects 
regarding the allocation of points in the awarding process, 
which varies across the projects analysed. But all of them take 
into account four aspects: i) Technical aspects related to 
building the infrastructure; ii) Technical aspects related to 
operation; iii) Economic-financial aspects related to the 
proposal; iv) Economic-financial aspects related to the 
sponsors’ solvency. 
 
TABLE II 
AWARDING CRITERIA FOR LRT PROJECTS BUILT IN SPAIN UNDER A BOT 
SCHEME (% OF POINTS) 
 
Technical 
aspects 
infrastructure 
Technical 
aspects 
operation 
Economi
c 
proposal 
Sponsors’ 
solvency 
Tenerife  40% 55% 5% 
Boadilla-Pozuelo 
(Madrid) 
7% 43% 37% 13% 
Las Tablas 
(Madrid) 
7% 43% 37% 13% 
Parla (Madrid) 7% 43% 37% 13% 
Metro Sevilla 26% 34% 35% 5% 
Metro Málaga  25% 35% 34% 6% 
Source: Elaborated by the authors with data taken from [6] 
 
 
 
  
 
 
IV. DOES THE SPANISH EXPERIENCE SHOW THAT PPP ARE 
MORE EFFICIENT THAN PUBLICLY OWNED LRT SYSTEMS? 
The analysis of advantages and disadvantages of public-
private partnerships versus publicly owned enterprises for 
building and operating light rail systems has been addressed in 
the last few years by a number of authors, including Clements 
and O’Mahony [7], Phang [8] and Mandri-Perrot [5]. The 
main reason for turning to the private sector is arguably that 
the private sector can provide more cost-effective and efficient 
solutions to problems, due to both its profit motive and its 
tendency to avoid over-engineering, a common fault of the 
public sector. Relying on the private sector for building and 
managing LRT systems, however, also involves higher 
borrowing costs, higher transaction costs and frequently an 
optimism bias—the tendency to leave unquantifiable risks out 
of the account. 
In this section we analyze whether the Spanish experience 
with LRT systems can contribute any evidence in this debate—
whether the analysis of the Spanish projects shows that public-
private partnerships are more efficient than public companies. 
We have been able to gather data related to operational 
expenditures, investment, and some aspects related to the 
operation of LRT. However, these data were available for only 
six projects. Of these six, four are BOT concessions 
(Trambaix, Trambessos, Seville and Pozuelo), one is managed 
by a publicly owned company (Valencia) and another one is 
managed by a enterprise with both public and private 
shareholders (Tenerife). 
As shown in Table 4, data on operational expenses show 
that there is no significant difference between the projects 
except for Valencia (a publicly owned LRT). However, the 
information provided for Valencia includes not only the 
operation of LRT but also of commuter train lines. Therefore, 
no relevant conclusions can be confidently drawn from the 
analysis of operational expense data, apart from the broad 
similarity across the projects analysed. 
Data on operational characteristics of the LRT systems 
show no relevant difference when it comes to commercial 
speed. The high speed of Sevilla’s LRT presents an anomaly, 
but it has not been possible for the authors to confirm that 
information or discover the reasons for the difference between 
this project and the others. The punctuality is very high for all 
the projects analysed and the number of accidents, where 
available, is also similar. Data related to number of complaints 
must be regarded as irrelevant since each project has dealt with 
complaints differently. 
Moving on to data covering investment in civil engineering 
works, significant variation can be observed. These 
differences, however, depend mainly on the percentage of the 
infrastructure built underground. The cost of installation has 
been significantly higher in the cases of Pozuelo (Madrid) and 
Sevilla, although the authors have again been unable to 
discover the causes. In the case of rolling stock, the costs have 
mostly clustered around 3 million euro per kilometre of rail, 
with the exception of the Tenerife project. 
The comparison between LRT systems under a BOT 
scheme and a publicly owned enterprise should ideally include 
an analysis of the projects’ financial performance. However, 
the information available did not allow such an analysis. In 
some cases, the information provided by the companies was 
vague and general, while in other cases (Valencia) the 
company does not distinguish between LRT lines and 
commuter trains, and finally in other cases the companies did 
not provide any financial information at all. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE III 
LIGHT RAIL SYSTEMS IN SPAIN, 2002-2012 
City (urban/metropolitan 
area) 
Year 
delivery 
into 
service 
Procurement model 
Length 
(km) 
Capital 
expenditure 
(Eur2007) 
Average 
annual pass. 
(million) 
Valencia 1994 Public enterprise 12.8 - 6.3 
Bilbao 2002 Public enterprise 5.2 21.3 2.2 
Alicante 2003 Public enterprise 93.2 - 2.4 
TramBaix (Barcelona) 2004 Concession (BOT) 15.8 238 10.2 
TramBessos (Barcelona) 2004 Concession (BOT) 13.5 213.6 2.8 
Vélez-Málaga 2006 Management contract 4.7 19.3 1.2 
Tenerife 2007 Mixed enterprise 12.3 227 12.2 
Boadilla-Pozuelo (Madrid) 2007 Concession (BOT) 22.4 362.2 17.7 
Las Tablas (Madrid) 2007 Concession (BOT) 5.4 262.3 3.4 
Parla (Madrid) 2007 Concession (BOT) 9.5 93.5 6.8 
Metro Sevilla 2009 Concession (BOT) 19 430 14.0 
Metro Málaga (*)  Concession (BOT) 14.7 456.2 17.1 
Metro Murcia (*)  Concession (BOT) 17 264 (2009) 10.8 
Palma de Mallorca (*)  Public enterprise 7.2 110 2.8 
Chiclana-Cádiz (*)  Concession (OT) 23.6 116.4 2.9 
Arganda (Madrid) (*)  Concession (BOT) 19.1 116.6 6.0 
(*) Under construction 
Source: Elaborated by the authors 
 
  
  
V. CONCLUSIONS 
The analysis of the Spanish experience with LRT systems 
shows that in this country there has been a shift from publicly 
owned enterprises in the early projects to BOT schemes. In 
most cases, the main reason for this shift appears to be lack of 
public resources. In some projects, particularly in the case of 
Madrid, this has been reinforced by the regional government’s 
need to reduce its public debt. 
The analysis of the available data did not allow us to 
conclude which one has been more efficient in building and 
managing LRT systems: publicly owned companies or BOT 
schemes. In most cases in Spain, it is too early to obtain data 
with sufficient track record. In addition, the data gathered by 
the authors for some of the projects were provided in a form 
that made comparison with other projects impossible. 
Thus, the research conducted for this paper constitutes a 
first step in the endeavour of using the Spanish experience 
with LRT systems to determine whether BOT schemes are 
more efficient than those managed by publicly owned 
enterprises. The analysis done in this paper should be 
continued in the near future as more data becomes available. 
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TABLE IV 
VARIOUS DATA RELATED TO LRT PROJECTS IN SPAIN 
 
  
Trambaix 
(Barcelona) 
Trambessos 
(Barcelona) 
Tenerife 
Pozuelo 
(Madrid) 
Sevilla Valencia 
Operational expenses (OPEX)       
 Operation (€/km)           4.21            4.46   n.a.            3,51   n.a. 12.4 
 Maintenance (€/km)           4.26            4.40   n.a.       3,87   n.a. 2.4 
 Total OPEX (€/km)  8.47    8.86    8.92          7,38   9.67 14.8 
Operation       
 Commercial speed (km/h)           17.8            18.8       21.0   23-26  30.0 17.5 
 Punctuality (%)       96.4        93.0        99.0           99,0   n.a. 99.1 
 N. accidents (2009)              40               29           35   n.a. n.a. n.a. 
 N. complaints           703             352      1,528   n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Investment (mill €/km rail)       
 Civil engineering works 8.6 6.7 15.82 15,7 24.8 n.a. 
 Installations 3 4.8 2.66 6,46 7.6 n.a. 
 Rolling stock 2.98 3.35 4.73 3,09 3.0 n.a. 
Source: Elaborated by the authors with data provided by the LRT companies 
 
